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Sebastian Harrer, Bonn University, Germany 
 
ABSTRACT: The 'late' Foucault and his purported 'return to the subject' is a much discussed 
issue. Over the past twenty years, various suggestions have been made as to how to integrate 
Foucault's ethics into his oeuvre as a whole. This paper holds that there is a 'conceptual 
continuity', rather than a break, between Foucault's earlier works on normalizing power, and 
his later works on ethical self-constitution. On the basis of a conceptual framework, which is 
developed in Section II, a reading of two themes concerning certain practices of the self is 
offered in the following sections (namely, dietetics and spiritual guidance). The material, 
drawn from the recently published lecture series L'herméneutique du sujet as well as from 
other published works, is related back to Foucault's ideas on the process of 'subjectivation', in 
order to support the claim that 'fabrication' and 'self-constitution' are but two aspects of 
subjectivation. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
While in his earlier works, Foucault deals with topics such as “Man’s death” 
in the western “epistêmê”, or with mechanisms of how subjects are 
“fabricated” and subjugated by disciplinary power, in his later works, 
beginning with the second volume of the History of Sexuality, Foucault 
develops an ethics that is based on a model of aesthetic self-fashioning. It is 
based on concepts such as “aesthetics of existence”, “ethics of the self”, or 
“care of the self”.1 These very concepts, along with the theories they are 
                                                 
1  The notion of “aesthetics of existence” refers to an understanding of ethics that 
derives from the philosophies of post-classical Greece and the Roman Empire, and 
these are the same sources that Foucault uses for his re-interpretation. The idea it 
refers to was called “ethics” in Antiquity, in the sense of a personal “ethos” (cf. 
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame (Indiana): 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2nd edition 1984), chap. 4) The idea of “Art”, which 
is implied by the term “aesthetics”, was always understood as an “imitation of life” in 
ancient philosophy (cf. Aristotle, Poetics, 1. 1447a). Hence, life itself cannot be 
interpreted as an “Art” in the sense of “aesthetics”. The ancient notion of “tekhnê tou 
biou”, i.e. the “art of living”, bears a different use of the term, as in “the art of 
woodcarving”, (cf. Julia Annas, “Virtue as a Skill,” International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 3 (1995): 227-243). While the idea behind it clearly derives from ancient 
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embedded in, have given rise to the hypothesis of a “return of the subject” in 
Foucault’s later philosophy. 
The “late Foucault” is probably one of the most widely discussed 
topics in research published on Foucault. A popular view on this late period 
holds that at some point in his oeuvre, Foucault turned away from analysing 
the power/knowledge mechanisms that fabricate subjects, and turned to 
analysing how subjects constitute themselves.2 This view sometimes implies 
the idea that these notions, “constitution” and “fabrication”, refer to two 
distinct phenomena.3 In this paper, I will argue against this view. Instead of a 
“return of the subject”, I will advocate the view that on the theme of 
subjectivity, we find a conceptual continuity traversing the whole of 
Foucault’s oeuvre, rather than a rupture that separates the “early” from the 
“late” Foucault. 
Assuming we granted the idea that the “subject” in Foucault’s later 
work is ontologically different from the one we find in his earlier work, we 
would have to assume that at the respective point in Foucault’s oeuvre, there 
is some sort of turn or even rupture in his thinking. And this can in turn be 
evaluated either positively or negatively. Those that have criticised Foucault 
                                                                                                                                            
thought, the notion of “aesthetics of existence”, which plays on the ambiguity of the 
word “art”, is a Foucaldian term. Recently, another aspect of this notion has been 
pointed out by Joseph Tanke (cf. his “Cynical aesthetics: A theme from Michel 
Foucault’s 1984 lectures at the Collège de France,” Philosophy Today 46, 2 (2002): 170- 
184). Tanke reports Foucault’s comparison of the way of life of the early Cynics to 
that of contemporary artists, pointing out that the forms of likening one’s life to one’s 
thinking involved in both of them are essentially the same. This is an idea that may 
also be implied to Foucault’s notion of the “aesthetics” of existence. 
2  Cf. Peter Dews, “The Return of the Subject in the Late Foucault,” Radical Philosophy 51 
(1989): 37-41; Jerold J Abrams, “Aesthetics of self-fashioning and cosmopolitanism: 
Foucault and Rorty on the art of living,” Philosophy Today 46, 2 (2002): 185-192; Ian 
Burkitt, “Technologies of the Self: Habitus and Capacities,” Journal for the Theory of 
Social Behaviour 32, 2 (2002): 219-237. 
3  Cf. Thomas Flynn, who holds that the philosophy of the late Foucault “fills in a gap 
in ‘structuralist’ historiography, namely, the absence of the individual, responsible 
agent”, p. 538 of his “Truth and Subjectivation in the later Foucault,” Journal of 
Philosophy 82 (1985): 531-540; furthermore: Tina Besley, “Social Education and Mental 
Hygiene: Foucault, disciplinary technologies and the moral constitution of youth,” 
Educational Philosophy and Theory 34, 4 (2002): 419-433; James D. Faubion, “Toward an 
Anthropology of Ethics: Foucault and the Pedagogies of Autopoiesis,” Edith 
Wyschogrod (ed.), The Ethical (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003): 146-165; also: Rob Devos, 
“The Return of the Subject in Michel Foucault,” American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 76, 2 (2002): 255-280: “In processes of self-constitution the subject is not only 
target and effect. The individual turns himself into a subject. Here we find an active 
‘I’ at work, who does not coincide with himself, but who objectifies himself and forms 
himself into a subject” (p. 278); Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living. Socratic 
Reflections from Plato to Foucault (Berkeley/ Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2000), 180. 
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for participating in the eradication of the subject in his earlier works will be 
likely to acclaim his return to the subject.4 Others may see it as an 
inconsistency in the global layout of Foucault’s philosophy.5 An interesting 
attempt to avoid this second-level debate altogether has been made by 
Richard Bernstein6 and (more recently) Amy Allen7, who simply argue that 
there had never been a “death of the subject” in Foucault’s philosophy at all, 
and that hence, there is no “return” of it either.8 
My argument is inspired by one of Foucault’s own remarks. Foucault 
scholars tend to locate his turn at the point where he focuses on ancient 
philosophy, i.e., from the second volume of the History of Sexuality (1984), seen 
from the perspective of all his published works. However, various texts 
published earlier hint at a period of transition. The question is, how far back 
do we have to push Foucault’s entry into his last period? One of Foucault’s 
own statements during an interview is enlightening about this matter: 
 
I am currently rereading the manuscripts that I wrote for this history of 
morals, and which concern the beginning of Christianity… I must say that it 
poses a problem for me, because this break did not appear progressively. It 
was in a very abrupt manner, from 1975-1976, that I completely abandoned 
this [former] style, insofar as I had it in mind to write a history of the subject, 
which would not be that of an event that would have taken place one day, 
                                                 
4  Famous critics of Foucault’s philosophy, some of which remain unreconciled even 
with his late period, include: Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1987), chap. 9 and 10; Axel Honneth, The 
Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory (Cambridge (MA): MIT 
Press, 1991), chap. 4.6; Thomas McCarthy, “The Critique of Impure Reason: Foucault 
and the Frankfurt School,” ibid., Ideals and Illusions: On Deconstruction and 
Reconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1991); 
Michael Walzer, “The Politics of Michel Foucault,” David Hoy (ed.), Foucault: A 
Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Charles Taylor, “Foucault on Freedom and 
Truth,” Foucault: A Critical Reader. 
5  Cf. Flynn, “Truth and Subjectivation in the later Foucault”. 
6  Richard Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of 
Modernity/Postmodernity (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1992), 154. 
7  Amy Allen, “The anti-subjective hypothesis: Michel Foucault and the death of the 
subject,” The Philosophical Forum 31, 2 (2000): 113-130. 
8  Another interesting contribution to the debate – which would actually render the 
debate itself superfluous – was made by Frédéric Gros, the editor of Foucault’s 
lecture series on L’Herméneutique du Sujet (cf. his “Sujet moral et soi éthique chez 
Foucault,” Archives de Philosophie 65, 2 (2002): 229-237). Gros does not think that what 
has come to be called Foucault’s “philosophy of the subject” was part of Foucault’s 
own philosophy. Rather, we should take notions such as “technologies of the self” 
and “relation to self” as a “reading grid for historical phenomena” (229: “grilles de 
lecture de phénomènes historiques”). However, numerous statements made by Foucault 
in essays or interviews suggest that his interest in the “technologies of the self” goes 
beyond a purely historical one. 
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and of which it would have been necessary to describe the genesis and the 
outcome.9 
 
Going by Foucault’s own recollections of the progress of his work, we would 
have to reassign at least the lecture series “Society must be defended” (1975/76), 
to the last period of Foucault’s thinking, thus locating it beyond the alleged 
turning point in his philosophy.10 This volume, mainly concerned with the 
workings of discipline in society, would then form part of his last period. This 
suggests that when he turned to re-interpreting ancient moral philosophy, 
Foucault was in fact not doing something completely unprecedented. We 
seem to have gotten the categories of classification wrong. What Foucault 
himself saw as his last turning point was the project of writing a “history of 
the subject”, as he mentions in the above interview, and not his turn to 
ethics.11 Seen from the broader perspective of his “history of the subject”, the 
mechanisms and techniques of how subjects constitute themselves as moral 
agents are inseparably linked to his analyses of the techniques of “subjection” 
or “subjugation” (“assujettissment”).12 Foucault himself seems always to have 
thought of the moral self-constitution as a derivative of, or a complement to, 
the constitution of subjects through normalizing power and subjugation. The 
genesis of the subject essentially includes these two sides: subjection and self-
constitution. Prompted by the above chronological observation, I will explore 
this idea further by way of a conceptual argument. 
A recently published lecture series, held by Foucault at the Collège de 
France in the session of 1981 to 1982, entitled L’Herméneutique du Sujet13, sheds 
                                                 
9  “Le retour de la morale,” Dits et Ecrits (= DE) IV, no. 354, 697: “Je suis en train de relire 
les manuscrits que j’ai écrits pour cette histoire de la morale et qui concernent le début du 
christianisme [...] En relisant ces manuscrits abandonnés depuis longtemps, je retrouve le 
même refus du style des Mots et les Choses, de l’Histoire de la Folie ou de Raymond Roussel. 
Je dois dire que ça me fait problème, parce que cette rupture ne s’est pas produite 
progressivement. C’est très brusquement, dès 1975-1976, que je me suis tout à fait départi de 
ce style, dans la mesure où j’avais en tête de faire une histoire du sujet, qui ne soit pas celle 
d’un événement qui se serait produit un jour et dont il aurait fallu raconter la genèse et 
l’aboutissement.” (Note: this and all subsequent translations are mine, S.H.). 
10  The case with the other works from this period, i.e., Discipline and Punish (1975) and 
The Will to Knowledge (1976), is doubtful. Thorough scholarly inquiry would have to 
be conducted into the question of how far Foucault’s preliminary studies for these 
works actually date back in time. 
11  Cf. also: “Le sujet et le pouvoir,” DE IV, no. 306, 222sq., and: L’usage des plaisirs (Paris: 
Gallimard, 2001 [orig. published in 1984]), 12 et seq. 
12  Cf. Wilhelm Schmid, Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Lebenskunst: die Frage nach dem 
Grund und die Neubegründung der Ethik bei Foucault (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 82; 
and: James W. Bernauer, Michel Foucault’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics for Thought 
(New Jersey/ London: Humanities Press, 1990), 123. 
13  Michel Foucault, L’herméneutique du sujet, Cours au Collège de France (1981-1982), 
édition établie sous la direction de François Ewald et Alessandro Fontana, par 
Frédéric Gros (Paris: Seuil/ Gallimard, 2001). 
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new light on this relation between (heteronomous) constitution and 
(autonomous14) self-constitution of subjects. It contains numerous recurring 
themes of “discipline” and “surveillance”, which I will point out in order to 
corroborate the thesis that fabrication and self-constitution of subjects are but 
two sides of the same coin, and that hence, there is no ontological difference 
between the subject in the “early” and the “late” Foucault. 
 
II. The Conceptual Framework of Subjectivity 
 
First, the notion of “assujettissement”15, well known from earlier works, 
reappears in Foucault’s later texts. It initially referred to the influence of 
normalizing power on individuals, which in turn “produces” or “fabricates” 
subjects. In the later texts, it appears again in the analysis of ethical self-
constitution by way of ascetic practices. This is especially evident in one of the 
readily accessible texts, The Use of Pleasure.16 Foucault says that for a given 
type of action, there are different possible ways to “conduct oneself” (“se 
conduire”). Two instances of a given type of action may be identical in respect 
of the positive properties that we may use to describe either of them; they 
may also be identical in respect of a moral law that they seem to abide by. 
However, the relation to self (“rapport à soi”) that is involved in each of the two 
instances may be different in significant ways. This is the way that an 
individual submits to a certain rule of conduct.17 By employing the idea of 
“assujettissement” (i.e., of submitting to a rule) for his analysis of ancient 
ethics, Foucault analyses ethics in terms of his models of power and 
government, well known from his earlier period. The difference, here, 
obviously does not lie in the area of the “content” of the practice of self-
government, but rather in its “attitude”.18 This is what ultimately determines 
whether a given practice – disciplinary as it may be in either case – serves as a 
“practice of freedom” or of subjugation. 
                                                 
14  This term is to be taken as the opposite of “heteronomous” in a conventional, and not 
in a Kantian sense. 
15  This is generally translated as “subjectivation”. Two considerations seem to advise 
against this translation. First, Foucault himself uses the French term “subjectivation”, 
the translation of which would result in ambiguity between this and the formerly 
mentioned term of “assujettissement”. Second, the French term “assujettissement” has a 
dominant aspect of “submitting-to”, “subjection”, or even “subjugation”, as with a 
tyrant ruling over his subjects. 
16  L’Usage des Plaisirs, 33-37. 
17  Foucault uses the character of King Nicocles to illustrate his point: whereas he is 
faithful to his wife because he strives for self-mastery, the commitment to marital 
faithfulness in Christian doctrine was based on divine commandment. 
18  Christoph Menke, “Two Kinds of Practice: On the Relation between Social Discipline 
and the Aesthetics of Existence,” Constellations 10, 2 (2003): 199-210 (208 et seq.). 
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Second, in Foucault’s conception of an “aesthetics of existence”, the 
notion of “discipline” that he employed to analyse the “disciplinary society” 
plays an equally important role. When Foucault speaks of an “art of living”, 
he refers to the ancient “tekhnê” with its set of secondary virtues. “Tekhnê” 
implies proper training and exercise in order for a person to bring it to 
perfection. And we can actually observe Foucault using the same schema on 
these ascetic practices, exercises and techniques, as he used in his analysis of 
the disciplinary conditioning of behaviour. (Foucault uses the term “dressage”, 
which refers to the taming of animals.) Disciplinary practices decompose 
human life and recompose it on the support of a very powerful structure. 
Third, we can follow the ramifications of Foucault’s notion of 
“surveillance” into his later texts. Of course, the instances of this notion have 
by then undergone some variations. But we may still say that the idea of 
“spiritual guidance” in the later texts occupies the position of what is called 
“surveillance” in the earlier works. “Spiritual guidance” is Foucault’s concept 
for the ancient teacher-student relationship. The conceptual link between 
discipline and surveillance is already being pointed out in Discipline and 
Punish, where Foucault writes that “the exercise of discipline requires a device 
that constrains by the game of the gaze”.19 The supervisor’s gaze can either be 
direct, as when the supervisor is a perceivable presence for the person being 
supervised, or else the gaze can be indirect, as in the case of the famous 
“panopticon” which Foucault analyses at length. Here, the supervisor’s 
presence cannot be perceived by the person being supervised. This second 
case marks a turning point because it can give rise to the third form of 
surveillance, which is the imaginary gaze: independently of the fact of 
whether the supervisor is present or not, the supervised person acts under his 
imaginary gaze, because the supervisor’s presence or absence cannot be 
known by the supervised person. In this third case, individuals are being 
trained to discipline themselves. Here again, we find the same model in 
Foucault’s analysis of spiritual guidance: the master can be in direct contact 
with his student, or in an exchange of written correspondence, or again the 
student can be asked to write regular reports for the attention of an imaginary 
addressee. This conception of spiritual guidance is, of course, drawn directly 
from the ancient sources: consider, e.g., Epictetus’ famous exhortation to his 
disciples, saying that they should live as if he was constantly watching them.20 
The common denominator of all of these examples is a certain conception of 
“power”.21 And this is what allows us to find a continuity between Foucault’s 
                                                 
19  Surveiller et punir. Naissance de la prison (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 173: “l’exercice de la 
discipline suppose un dispositif qui contraigne par le jeu du regard”. 
20  Reported in Seneca, Epistulae, 32, 1. 
21  Richard Lynch also argues for a continuity in Foucault’s conception of power (cf. his 
“Is power all there is? Michel Foucault and the ‘omnipresence’ of power relations,” 
Philosophy Today 42, 1 (1998): 65-70). However, his analysis focuses on power relations 
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earlier works on normalizing power and later works on ethical self-
constitution. A subject arises through various modes of “subjectivation”, 
some of them through normalizing power mechanisms, others through 
technologies or practices of the self (“pratiques de soi”). But the subject really is 
and remains only a “hollow gap” in the field of power relations.22 This 
conception rests on two premises, one of which I will call the “Nietzschean 
theory of power”23, the other of which is the premise of “anti-essentialism”. 
According to the latter, every entity is determined by something else with 
which or whom it is in a relationship of power. From a genealogical 
perspective, that which allegedly is a thing’s essence is constructed from “the 
other”, or from an “altérité”, as Foucault puts it. The core of things, their 
essence, really is formed by the “outside” (“le dehors”). Thus, since there is no 
such thing as a substantial subject, since man does not possess an immutable 
human nature, mankind’s subjectivity needs to be constructed, as Foucault 
says, “piece by piece from figures other than themselves”.24 Hence, the 
question of who we are, i.e., the question concerning the subject’s essence, is 
not a matter of metaphysics, but of interpretation, where this term has to be 
taken in a very specific sense: 
 
If to interpret means to seize, by violence or by deceit, a system of rules that 
does not have any essential signification in itself, and to impose upon it a 
[new] direction, to bend it to a new will, to insert it into a different game and 
to submit it to secondary rules, if so, then the destiny of humanity is a series 
of interpretations.25 
                                                                                                                                            
in the “social landscape”. As I will argue in this paper, the full scope of Foucault’s 
conception of power is revealed only by interpreting it as a quasi-metaphysical 
notion. On Foucault’s analytics of power, cf. also: Hinrich Fink-Eitel, “Michel 
Foucaults Analytik der Macht,” Friedrich A. Kittler (ed.), Austreibung des Geistes aus 
den Geisteswissenschaften. Programme des Poststrukturalismus (Paderborn et al.: 
Schöningh, 1980): 38-78; and: Roger Deacon, “An analytics of power relations: 
Foucault on the history of discipline,” History of the Human Sciences 15, 1 (2002): 89–
117. 
22  The term is drawn from: Kirsten Hebel, “Dezentrierung des Subjekts in der Selbstsorge. 
Zum ästhetischen Aspekt einer nicht-normativen Ethik bei Foucault,” G. Gamm, G. 
Kimmerle (eds.), Ethik und Ästhetik: nachmetaphysische Perspektiven (Tübingen: Edition 
Diskord, 1990): 226-241. 
23  Foucault explicitly refers his own model to Nietzsche’s theory, which he calls 
“l’hypothèse de Nietzsche”, Michel Foucault, “Il faut défendre la société”, Cours au Collège 
de France (1975-1976), édition établie sous la direction de François Ewald et 
Alessandro Fontana, par Mauro Bertani et Alessandro Fontana (Paris: Seuil/ 
Gallimard, 1997), 17. 
24  “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire,” DE II, no. 84, 138: “pièce à pièce à partir de 
figures qui lui sont étrangères”. 
25  Ibid., p. 146: “Si interpréter, c’était mettre lentement en lumière une signification enfouie 
dans l’origine, seule la métaphysique pourrait interpréter le devenir de l’humanité. Mais si 
interpréter, c’est s’emparer, par violence ou subreption, d’un système de règles qui n’a pas en 
soi de signification essentielle, et lui imposer une direction, le ployer à une volonté nouvelle, le 
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Just as much as Nietzsche is in opposition to classical hermeneutics in the 
wake of Schleiermacher, interpretation for Foucault is a power game. And this 
is where the Nietzschean theory of power comes into play. By using the above 
terminology, we can say: individuals are being interpreted or interpret 
themselves, not in the sense of discovering their innermost essence, but in the 
sense of being submitted to relationships of force or voluntarily applying 
them to themselves.26 Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow call this the 
“malleability” of individuals.27 They are, so to speak, the malleable material 
on which the processes of subjectivation are at work. 
One may wonder why I have so far spoken about “relationships of 
power”, since at least in one respect, we would conventionally assume a 
unidirectional model of power. This is seemingly the case in relationships of 
domination: one person or group exercises power over another person or 
group. However, when speaking of “force”, we are theoretically compelled to 
analyse not a force, but a field of forces. This phenomenon is well known from 
elementary physics, and I will call it the principle of action and reaction. Let 
us stay within the conceptual field of the above quoted notion of 
“malleability” and consider the following example: if we use a hammer to 
strike a blow at a block of marble, that block would immediately shatter into 
pieces if it did not in some way offer resistance. That is why shattering a block 
of marble with a hammer may be quite an exhausting task. It is this physical 
effect of two forces encountering each other, according to the principle of 
action and reaction, which enables a sculptor to sculpt a block of marble into a 
new shape. Thus, shape or form is the effect of an encounter of two or more 
forces. The philosophical version of this idea derives from Nietzsche, and 
Gilles Deleuze puts it this way: “Every force is in a relationship with others, in 
order either to obey or to command. That which defines a body is this 
relationship between dominant and dominated forces”.28 This observation of 
Deleuze’s also applies surprisingly well to Foucault, considering the latter’s 
analysis of the “fabrication”29 of “docile bodies” in Discipline and Punish.30 
                                                                                                                                            
faire entrer dans un autre jeu et le soumettre à des règles secondes, alors le devenir de 
l’humanité est une série d’interprétations.” 
26  Hence, Schmid calls Foucault’s theory of subjectivation an “exoteric theory of 
subjectivity” (Schmid, Auf der Suche nach einer neuen Lebenskunst, 248 et seq.). 
27  Cf.: Hubert Dreyfus, Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and 
Hermeneutics (University of Chicago Press, second edition, 1983), 143 et seq. 
28  Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie (Paris: PUF, 1973), 45: “Toute force est en 
rapport avec d’autres, soit pour obéir, soit pour commander. Ce qui définit un corps est ce 
rapport entre des forces dominantes et des forces dominées.” 
29  “Il faut défendre la société”, 39. 
30  Cf. Foucault’s remarks on power in: “L’intellectuel et les pouvoirs,” DE IV, no. 359, 
750sq.: “Le pouvoir, c’est essentiellement des relations, c’est-à-dire ce qui fait que les 
individus, les êtres humains sont en relation les uns avec les autres, non pas simplement sous 
la forme de la communication d’un sens, pas simplement sous la forme du désir, mais 
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Deleuze uses a slight variation of his terminology in his book on Foucault. 
There, he writes that “form is a compound[ed] of relationships of force”.31  
The process of self-constitution is situated in a field of forces and starts 
out through a relationship to others, which in turn aims at producing a 
relation to self (“rapport à soi”). This is achieved by way of certain ascetic 
technologies of the self, which one practices first under supervision of a 
master. This relationship is then replicated inside the subject, who will 
eventually take a “transcendental position” towards him- or herself.32 This is 
evident when we consider that in ascetic practices, one works on oneself. The 
ethical relationship to oneself, i.e., self-constitution, is actually a “fold-back” 
(“repli”) of the force.33 Force, which is to govern and dominate others, is being 
bent back on the subject itself. Deleuze calls this the “self-affection” (“auto-
affectation”) of the force. Thus, self-constitution is derivative of the 
governmental mode of power. In this respect, we need to remember that 
“force” is not a good or an item that can be possessed, it is a field-effect. Self-
affection can only take place after the force has been established in a field of 
relationships with others. 
This is why the mode of the relationship to others that the subject 
practices will be the primordial determining factor of the mode of the relation 
to self that is being aimed at. After all, the relationship between the self (“soi”) 
and the other (“autrui”) will be reconstructed within the subject in order to 
become the permanent support for the care that the subject has for him- or 
herself. So indeed, as Menke goes on to claim in the above quoted passage, 
“practice itself is ambiguous”.34 There is no difference in content between 
disciplinary and ethical practices. Because Foucault conceives of (ethical) self-
constitution by the same principles that underlie the (heteronomous) 
constitution of subjects, both phenomena are equally subordinate to a 
common species, which is “subjectivation” in general. Interestingly, this latter 
notion had been the subject matter of Foucault’s thinking long before his 
alleged “ethical turn”. My intention so far has been to point out how 
Foucault’s earlier and later thinking on subjectivity are compatible and 
continuous, and more specifically regarding my present argument, how 
                                                                                                                                            
également sous une certaine forme qui leur permet d’agir les uns sur les autres et, si vous 
voulez, en donnant un sens très large à ce mot, de se ‘gouverner’ les uns les autres.” 
31  Deleuze, Foucault, 131: “forme est un composé de rapports de forces”. 
32  Cf. L’Herméneutique du Sujet, 56. Newman calls this the “fictional division” inside the 
subject while involved in ascetic practices (cf.: Robert J. Newman, “Cotidie meditare. 
Theory and Practice of the meditatio in Imperial Stoicism,” Aufstieg und Niedergang der 
römischen Welt, part II, vol. 36. 3: 1473-1517 (1480)). 
33  Already, in the text “Nietzsche, Freud, Marx”, dating from 1964, we can read that 
Foucault defines “profondeur” as “une plie de la surface”, an idea which was to become 
the leitmotiv in his ethical thought, 15 years later. 
34  Menke, “Two Kinds of Practice…,” 208 et seq. 
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Foucault’s account of the “fabrication” of subjects through disciplinary power 
carries over into his late work on ethical self-constitution.35 
I have tried to provide a conceptual framework for the theme of 
“subjectivation”, drawn from a variety of sources in Foucault and research on 
his work. This section should be taken as a theoretical guideline for my 
discussion of Foucault’s actual analyses, and not as a theory for its own sake. 
In the following sections, I will propose a reading of two conceptions that 
form part of Foucault’s aesthetics of existence: “dietetics” and “spiritual 
guidance”36. Both are ascetic practices, used for the goal of ethical self-
constitution that we find in Foucault’s latest texts. My aim will be to point out 
the novel perspective that L’Herméneutique du Sujet provides for 
understanding these concepts, sometimes referring to other later works by 
Foucault, sometimes drawing from the above-mentioned lecture series itself. 
 
                                                 
35  My conceptual analysis establishes that the notion of “subjectivation”, along 
Foucault’s own lines, equally comprises the aspects of “fabrication” and ethical “self-
constitution”. The argument that I put forward in my paper explicitly holds that – in 
contrast to rivalling interpretations of Foucault’s later thinking on ethics – ethical self-
constitution implies the same practices – in terms of “content” – as the fabrication of 
subjects. An interesting question, which I unfortunately cannot deal with in the 
present paper, would be whether my argument is reversible. This is to say that, if I 
have successfully demonstrated how themes from the earlier work carry over into 
Foucault’s later thinking, is it also true that some form of self-subjectivation can be 
found in his earlier work on normalizing power? Along with this goes the question of 
whether the two aspects of subjectivation, which I have viewed conceptually, are 
actually fully developed in every instance of the theme, or whether this is only the 
case in Foucault’s later work. I wish to thank my anonymous referees for drawing my 
attention to this point. 
36  There is rich evidence and documentation of Foucault’s interest in issues of education 
and education policy from very early on in his career. In 1965, Foucault ran for the 
post of Vice Director of Tertiary Education of the Humanities in the French Ministry 
of Education (DE I, “Chronologie,” 27 [January 1965]); in the end, he was not elected, 
allegedly because of a campaign that exploited his sexual orientation (ibid. [May 
1965]). Theoretical evidence in this issue can be found above all in a text from 1984, 
where Foucault takes a retrospective view on his activities in that field (“L’éthique du 
souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté,” DE IV, no. 356, 727: “Prenons aussi quelque chose 
qui a été l’objet de critiques souvent justifiées: l’institution pédagogique. Je ne vois pas où est 
le mal dans la pratique de quelqu’un qui, dans un jeu de vérité donné, sachant plus qu’un 
autre, lui dit ce qu’il faut faire, lui apprend, lui transmet un savoir, lui communique des 
techniques; le problème est plutôt de savoir comment on va éviter dans ces pratiques – où le 
pouvoir ne peut pas ne pas jouer et où il n’est pas mauvais en soi – les effets de domination qui 
vont faire qu’un gosse sera soumis à l’autorité arbitraire et inutile d’un instituteur, un 
étudiant sous la coupe d’un professeur autoritaire, etc. Je crois qu’il faut poser ce problème en 
termes de règles de droit, de techniques rationnelles de gouvernement et d’êthos, de pratique 
de soi et de liberté”). 
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III. Dietetics 
 
Dietetic practices are an example of disciplinary practices applied by the 
subject to him- or herself. The relevance of dietetics for a philosophical way of 
life was discovered in Antiquity (remember the dietary rules of the 
Pythagoreans), and was certainly brought to Foucault’s attention by the 
works of Nietzsche.37 In dietetics, philosophy associates itself with medicine, 
and to be more specific, with a type of medical science that was more 
common in Antiquity than nowadays, one that is concerned with instructions 
and precepts on how to live a healthy life. Such an art of living combines 
philosophy, as a therapy of soul and mind, and medicine, as a therapy of the 
body. This is why Nietzsche, whose philosophy is certainly less of a doctrinal 
system than it is an art of living, calls the proper philosopher a “philosopher-
physician”.38 
According to Foucault, the link between philosophy and medicine was 
wrought at the “golden age of self-concern”, which he situates in the first and 
second centuries A.D., i.e., during the epoch of Hellenistic philosophy under 
the Roman Empire.39 At that time, the “self-concern” (“epimeleia heautou”) had 
become coextensive with the human lifespan, whereas in the epoch of Plato it 
had been a task solely for young men during their education as citizens and 
possible future rulers. Thus, since one was supposed to practice self-concern 
throughout one’s life, philosophical practice was assimilated to some sort of 
medical practice40, and, to be more specific, to prophylactic medicine.41 The 
aim was to maintain and to fully develop a state of health and physical fitness 
that may never have been present in the individual, but was nonetheless 
indicated by the natural constitution of the individual, as a sort of telos. 
 
Medicine was, therefore, not conceived of simply as a technique of 
intervention, appealing to remedies or surgery in the case of illness. As a 
form of knowledge, it was also meant to define a way of life, a mode of 
reflective relationship to oneself, to one’s body, to food, to waking and 
                                                 
37  Cf. for example, Friedrich Nietzsche, Aurora, book five, no. 553. 
38  Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, Foreword, no. 2. 
39  L’herméneutique du sujet, 79. 
40  Ibid., 94. 
41  Cf. Wolfgang Detel, Macht, Moral, Wissen, Foucault und die klassische Antike (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1998), 121. It is quite interesting that this term itself does not appear in 
Foucault. It is evident that “dietetics” as part of a philosophical way of life can only 
belong to prophylactic medicine, since it is concerned with structuring human life 
with the goal of development, growth and self-fulfilment, and not with treating 
illnesses that can never be predicted with certainty. To use the stoic terms, we can say 
that the object of prophylactic medicine, i.e. ,the structuring of our way of life, 
“depends on us”, whereas the object of therapeutic medicine, i.e., illnesses, “does not 
depend on us”. 
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sleeping, to different activities and to the environment. Medicine had to 
propose, by way of a diet, a voluntary and rational structure of conduct.42 
 
The link between philosophy and medicine was strengthened by what 
Foucault calls the “identity of a conceptual framework”.43 The central notion 
in this respect is the Greek term “pathos”, which can be translated as 
“passion” and “illness” alike. Remember that in most of the schools’ 
doctrines, a philosophical way of life was defined as a life lived according to 
reason (“kata logon zên”). Thus, “passion” was to be extirpated from one’s life 
through practicing philosophy. In the same way, medicine and dietetics were 
supposed to keep away illnesses, and above all to prevent possible 
pathological affections from turning into chronic diseases. The analogy was 
made that the development of an illness into a chronic disease is structurally 
comparable to the development of a “passion” into “vice” (the latter of which 
is, quite evidently, the opposite of virtue, in the sense of “arête”).44 Foucault 
cites two examples of this view of philosophy and medicine from Antiquity: 
in his De Vita Contemplativa, Philon of Alexandria mentions the philosophical 
school of the “Therapists”, who had retired to the hinterland of Alexandria to 
practice their way of philosophy as a “cure of the soul”. And again, Foucault 
cites Epictetus, who frequently calls his philosophical school an “iatreion” (a 
clinic), and summarizes his maxim as: “So, before you embark upon 
memorizing syllogisms, ‘heal your wounds, put a stop to the fluctuation of 
your humours, calm your spirit!’”45 In the lineage of these ancient exponents, 
“diet”, as Foucault says, “is a whole art of living”.46 
So what is actually covered by the discipline of dietetics? Foucault 
follows Hippocrates (or whoever is the author of book IV of the Epidemias) 
                                                 
42  Le souci de soi (Paris: Gallimard, 2001 [orig. published in 1984]), 136: “A ce titre la 
médecine n’était pas conçue simplement comme une technique d’intervention, faisant appel, 
dans les cas de maladie, aux remèdes ou aux opérations. Elle devait aussi, sous la forme d’un 
corpus de savoir et de règles, définir une manière de vivre, un mode de rapport réfléchi à soi, à 
son corps, à la nourriture, à la veille et au sommeil, aux différentes activités et à 
l’environnement. La médecine avait à proposer, sous la forme du régime, une structure 
volontaire et rationnelle de conduite.” 
43  L’herméneutique du sujet, 94-96. 
44  On top of this conceptual link, Foucault argues for an etymological link between the 
two disciplines through the common term of “therapeuein”. Cf. ibid.: “Or therapeuein 
heauton voudra dire à la fois: se soigner, être à soi-même son propre serviteur, et se rendre à 
soi-même un culte.” By pooling three possible meanings of “therapeuein,” probably 
identified in a Greek lexicon, i.e., “to give medical treatment”, “to serve”, and “to 
worship”, Foucault wishes to amalgamate medicinal and philosophical practices in 
every occurrence of “therapeuein heauton”. However, this does not conform to 
standard philological methods. 
45  L’herméneutique du sujet, 96: “Et avant donc de vous lancer à apprendre les syllogismes, 
‘guérissez vos blessures, arrêtez le flux de vos humeurs, clamez votre esprit’!”. 
46  L’usage des plaisirs, 133: “le régime est tout un art de vivre”. 
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and states that dietetic rules apply to exercises (“ponoi”), food (“sitia”), drink 
(“pota”), sleep (“hypnoi”), and sexual relationships (“aphrodisia”), i.e., to all 
things that need to be “measured”.47 Thus, a “diet” has to take into account a 
host of elements from the physical existence of an individual: “diet, seen in 
detail, takes on the appearance of a genuine timetable”.48 
In fact, dietetics demands two types of vigilance exercised over the 
body and its activities: first, it demands a “serial vigilance”: 
 
Activities are not simply good or bad in themselves; their value is in part 
determined by those activities that precede them and those that follow, and 
the same thing (a certain food, a type of exercise, a hot or a cold bath) will be 
recommended or advised against, depending on this or that other activity 
that one has just done or is obliged to do.49 
 
“Serial vigilance” is attention paid to sequences of activities or elements. To 
take an example from everyday life: it is probably not a good idea to go for a 
10km run after having a copious meal, whereas running in general is highly 
recommendable. 
The second type of vigilance is “circumstantial vigilance”, which is 
attention paid to the external world, to its conditions, elements, and 
sensations. It comprises: “the climate, of course, the seasons, the hours of the 
day, the degree of humidity and dryness, of heat or cold, the characteristics of 
a given region, the situation of a town”. It is essentially a “medical 
perception” of the world50, in which every element of the medium in which 
the individual is placed is seen as having a certain positive or negative effect. 
Foucault quotes an example drawn from Antyllos: from the perspective of 
circumstantial vigilance, it makes a difference whether one lives in the 
countryside or in the city. In both cases, the geographical implantation will 
also be important. Let us say that one lives in the city: one has to take into 
account the neighbourhood one lives in, the situation of the house, and the 
layout of the rooms (street side or courtyard side, ambient climate of each 
individual room, etc.).51 The same goes for a dietetic analysis of time: Foucault 
mentions Athenaios’s breakdown of time, going from ages to years, seasons, 
weeks, days, times of the day and finally to hours. To take but one example, 
Athenaios offers certain recommendations for the season of “winter”, namely 
                                                 
47  Cf. ibid., 134. 
48  Ibid.:“le régime, quand on le détaille, prend l’allure d’un véritable emploi du temps”. 
49  Ibid., 140: “Les activités ne sont pas simplement bonnes ou mauvaises en elles-mêmes; leur 
valeur est pour une part déterminée par celles qui les précèdent et celles qui les suivent et la 
même chose (une certaine nourriture, un type d’exercice, un bain chaud ou froid) sera 
recommandée ou déconseillée selon qu’on aura eu ou qu’on doit avoir telle ou telle autre 
activité.” 
50  Le souci de soi, 138. 
51  Ibid., 138 et seq. 
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to seek out enclosed, covered and warm areas, to wear warm clothes, to 
breathe with a part of one’s clothing in front of the mouth, etc. He gives 
recommendations likewise for nutrition and physical exercises that are 
appropriate for this season.52 
The two types of vigilance thus constitute two distinct orders: the first 
one, “serial vigilance”, refers to a homologous series, i.e., a series constituted by 
elements of the same type, namely the activities of one individual. The second 
one, “circumstantial vigilance”, refers to a heterologous series, i.e., to the 
interferences between the subject and the medium in which he or she is 
placed, in both a spatial and temporal sense. Both of these two orders function 
according to the principle of decomposing their elements into smaller units. In 
order to find the right dietetic measure for a given activity in a given 
situation, we have to merge the two series and combine the serial and the 
circumstantial values of a given element to find out its resulting value in a 
given situation. 
At first glance, this mechanism bears a striking similarity to the 
disciplinary practices I have mentioned earlier. What exactly does this 
“similarity” consist in? Just like the mechanism of serial and circumstantial 
vigilance, discipline decomposes an activity into smaller units, and arranges 
them in a coordinate plane of time and space; it also divides space into 
functional units and allocates one of these units to an individual exercising a 
certain activity, at a certain moment within the timetable. Discipline 
decomposes activities, space, and time into smaller units and combines these 
results to develop a timetable. This is what Foucault, in Discipline and Punish, 
calls “quadrillage”: the dividing-up of space and time, and the allocation of 
certain functional spatio-temporal units to certain types of individuals or 
activities. We can now see precisely wherein lies the “similarity” mentioned 
above: dietetics – as an example of an ascetic self-practice – is based on 
disciplinary practices, just as the “dressage” of soldiers or prisoners is. Both 
are, so to speak, identical in “content”. The aim is to render certain activities 
more efficient, and furthermore to make other activities possible at all, namely 
the ones that will only function properly when exercised within a disciplinary 
framework. Discipline engenders a new type of activity. The link between 
disciplinary and dietetic practices is evident, and we can even say that 
dietetics belongs to the type of activities that are not possible outside a 
disciplinary setting. An art of living in terms of ascetic self-practices is 
essentially dependent on disciplinary mechanisms. 
 
                                                 
52  Cf.: ibid., 139 et seq. 
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IV. Spiritual Guidance 
 
Before we continue our inquiry, we need to remember that the relationship to 
others, e.g., in spiritual guidance, is in fact the primary stage of self-
constitution, whereas genuine self-practices, such as the above-mentioned 
dietetics, are actually secondary. Hence, the subject will have internalised an 
“attitude” through relationships to others, before  exercising any self-practices 
at all. Foucault analyses the conception of education that was predominant in 
the ancient schools of philosophy. There, the master did not play the role of a 
“professor”, he would not teach his students a certain body of knowledge. On 
the contrary, his task was to participate in the development of a relation to 
self within his student. This is the idea of education in the sense of “spiritual 
guidance” that Foucault follows for his conception of an aesthetics of 
existence: 
 
But what defines the position of the master is that which he is concerned about, which 
is [precisely] the care that the one whom he is instructing can have for himself. As 
opposed to a professor, he is not concerned about teaching the person whom he 
instructs certain proficiencies or abilities, his aim is not to teach him how to talk, his 
aim is not to teach him how to get the better of the others, etc. The master is he who is 
concerned about the concern that the subject has for himself…53 
 
The master teaches his student to care for himself, through ascetic exercises.54 
Ascesis itself is only a means of development and transformation, of course. It 
does not come with a doctrine. This is why Foucault distinguishes between 
two “layers” (“couches”) of ascetics. The first is meant to develop a link 
between knowledge (“mathêsis”) and practice (“askêsis”). He uses the Greek 
term “paraskeuê”, i.e., “preparation”, to refer to this first layer.55 Teaching and 
instruction are located here because the student needs to learn a doctrine and 
to acquire it through “incorporation” (to use a Nietzschean word). Even at 
this stage, instruction is not detached from spiritual and ascetic practices. The 
“paraskeuê” aims at transforming the subject’s entire being, not only his or her 
knowledge and proficiencies.56 This first stage, the preparation, ties the subject 
                                                 
53  L’herméneutique du sujet, 58: “Mais ce qui définit la position du maître, c’est que ce dont il se 
soucie, c’est du souci que celui qu’il guide peut avoir de lui-même. A la différence du 
professeur, il ne se soucie pas d’apprendre à celui qu’il guide des aptitudes ou des capacités, il 
ne cherche pas à lui apprendre à parler, il ne cherche pas à lui apprendre à l’emporter sur les 
autres, etc. Le maître, c’est celui qui se soucie du souci que le sujet a de lui-même…”. 
54  Spiritual and ascetic exercises were a means commonly employed in moral education 
in Antiquity. Numerous treatises on spiritual exercises seem to have been in 
circulation (cf. Diogenes Laertios, Vitae VII, 166 et seq.). However, very few have been 
preserved. Prominent examples are the treatises “peri askêseôs” (“on exercise”) by 
Epictetus (Diatribae, III, 12) and Musonius (Musonii reliquiae, ed. Hense, Leipzig 1905). 
55  L’Herméneutique du Sujet, 306. 
56  Ibid., 301 et seq. 
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to an acquired truth, in the sense of a link between self-knowledge and self-
concern.57 
Foucault follows a definition of “paraskeuê” given by Demetrius, which 
is reported in Seneca.58 First, “paraskeuê” is meant to prepare for the events of 
life. It is not meant primarily to train the student for the position of orator or 
lawyer. It is rather concerned with teaching elementary and readily accessible 
techniques for coping with accidents and misfortune, for succeeding in life in 
a very general sense, and for abiding by a philosophical way of life. 
Second, “paraskeuê” is concerned with the object that is being taught, 
with a doctrine and its elements, propositions, or discourses (“logoi”). This is 
not to say that the type of education that Foucault analyses here always 
adhered to a specific school doctrine. In fact, in spite of rivalling doctrines, the 
Hellenistic schools were quite close to each other in respect of ethics and 
spiritual practices. Teaching could be quite eclectic.59 An important criterion 
for the “logoi” to be taught, however, is that they all be principles for action 
and general behaviour. Thus, learning and internalising a “logos” essentially 
means developing a respective ethos. 
And third, “paraskeuê” is concerned with teaching so-called “logoi 
boêthoi”, i.e., “helpful precepts”. 
                                                 
57  Foucault discusses the link between the Delphic dictum of “Know thyself!” (“gnôthi 
seautôn”) and the Hellenistic principle of “care of the self” (L’Herméneutique du Sujet, 
18: “epimeleia heautou”; Plato uses the term “epimeleia tês psykhês” in Apologia 29d-30c). 
According to him, the former is subordinated to the latter. By trying to transform our 
being through ascetic practices, we may achieve a kind of “harmony” between our 
acts and our thoughts. Foucault calls this a “feedback-effect” of truth (“effet de 
retour”). In Antiquity, this phenomenon was not limited to ethics only. Ancient 
epistemology was linked with spirituality. If we seek access to a certain truth, we 
may be required to perform spiritual exercises, and to work in order to transform 
ourselves and our epistemological structure. Only afterwards will certain truths be 
accessible to us. The modern concept of epistemology, which is that of scientific 
method, is completely different. What is required for knowledge of the truth, is a set 
of methodological rules and a standard configuration of the epistemological subject 
(i.e., one must not be intoxicated, dreaming, or affected by mental delusion etc.). 
Philosophers of our time have often been puzzled by what is called the Socratic 
“moral intellectualism”, i.e., the idea that no one who actually knows the good will 
act wrong. It is often taken to imply a statement about human nature, and this causes 
perplexity. However, we can also interpret this statement in the line of an “ascetic 
epistemology”: if we take for granted that at the time of Socrates, “true knowledge” 
did not merely mean computational registration of given data, but appropriation of a 
truth through ascetic and spiritual practices, then the idea of “moral intellectualism” 
does not seem so odd any more. Habitualised practical truth is directly linked to 
action, in the sense that the subject has exercised this implication through meditation, 
training and ascesis. The purportedly puzzling statement is really only a remark 
about spirituality in virtue ethics. 
58  L’Herméneutique du Sujet, 306-317. 
59  Pierre Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 414 et seq. 
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Paraskeuê is the structure of the permanent transformation of true discourse, 
firmly rooted in the subject, into principles of behaviour that are morally 
admissible. Or again, paraskeuê is the element of the transformation of logos 
into ethos.60 
 
The “helpful discourses” are being learnt so that one will have them always 
“at hand”, or to put it in a military metaphor that Foucault uses: so that one is 
“armed” with them.61 This is connected to an interesting concept of agency. 
When the subject internalises a helpful precept (which is related to action in a 
situation of immediate urgency), the precept itself becomes so deeply 
anchored in the subject, that in a real-life situation it is no longer the subject 
who acts, but the precepts themselves.62 The idea is that spontaneous action 
takes the place of conscious deliberation. The fact that Foucault seems to 
conceive of some sort of quasi-agent within the actual agent is suggested by 
the metaphors of corporality that he uses: 
 
The role of writing is to constitute, along with everything that reading has 
constituted, a ‘body’ (quicquid lectione collectum est, stilus redigat in corpus). 
And this body we must understand, not as a body of doctrine, but rather – 
following the oft-evoked metaphor of digestion – as the body itself of the one 
who, transcribing his readings, has appropriated them for himself and made 
their truth his own. Reading transforms what is seen or heard into “forces 
and blood” (in vires, in sanguinem). It becomes a principle of rational action 
inside the writer himself.63 
                                                 
60  L’Herméneutique du Sujet, 312: “La paraskeuê, c’est la structure de transformation 
permanente des discours vrais, bien ancrés dans le sujet, en principes de comportement 
moralement recevables. La paraskeuê encore, c’est l’élément de transformation du logos en 
êthos.” 
61  Le souci de soi, 137sq.: “On reconnaît là facilement un des principes essentiels de la pratique 
de soi: être armé, pour l’avoir toujours sous la main, d’un ’discours secourable’ qu’on a appris 
très tôt, qu’on se répète souvent et qu’on médite régulièrement. Le logos médical est de ceux-
là, dictant en chaque instant le bon régime de la vie.” 
62  Foucault (L’Herméneutique du Sujet, 309) calls the “logoi boêthoi” “action induction 
schemes”. Paul Rabbow (Seelenführung. Methodik der Exerzitien in der Antike 
(München, 1954), 124) compares them to a constant “ringing in your ear” (this is how 
he translates the Greek metaphor of “enaulon”). Alexander Nehamas (The Art of 
Living, 95 et seq.) seems to endorse a similar view. However, Pierre Hadot is highly 
critical of this “quasi-behaviouristic” interpretation. In his study on Marcus Aurelius 
(Pierre Hadot, La Citadelle intérieure. Introduction aux Pensées de Marc Aurèle (Paris: 
Fayard, 1992), 53), he writes that the “logoi” are rather condensed versions of longer 
demonstrations. They serve as mnemonic devices meant to bring the soul into the 
same disposition it was in while grasping the truth of the original demonstration. 
And this state of disposition is naturally believed to motivate to action. 
63  L’Herméneutique du Sujet, 422: “Le rôle de l’écriture est de constituer, avec tout ce que la 
lecture a constitué, un ‘corps’ (quicquid lectione collectum est, stilus redigat in corpus). Et ce 
corps, il faut le comprendre non pas comme un corps de doctrine, mais bien – en suivant la 
métaphore si souvent évoquée de la digestion – comme le corps même de celui qui, en 
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Thus, in following Foucault on this point, the logos of the acquired doctrine is 
literally transformed into a kernel of agency within the agent. 
Inside the structure of “paraskeuê”, there are three basic techniques of 
learning and teaching, which are all understood through the model of ascetic 
practices: listening, reading and writing, and speaking. It may seem odd at 
first to think of these three activities as “ascetic practices”. ‘What is there to be 
practiced in listening?’ we may ask, even more oddly, ‘What kind of ascetism 
is there to it?’ Let us look at the three concepts and consider their ascetic 
relevance. 
Listening is the fundamental practice of the student in the process of 
education. Foucault uses two terms from Seneca and Epictetus to describe 
hearing as the most passive (“pathêtikos”) and the most logical (“logikos”) of all 
the senses. That is to say that hearing is the primordial pathway for acquiring 
logically or linguistically structured knowledge. We can listen to what people 
teach us before we are able to read it. It is also to say that we cannot help but 
hear, even if we make an effort to divert our attention from an undesired 
source of sound. Combining these observations brings us to the conclusion 
that we actually have to practise our listening. Because, first of all, listening to 
philosophical lectures is not the same thing as listening to gossip in the street. 
Philosophical discourse has a logical structure to it that we might not grasp 
without sufficient training.64 And second, we must learn to stay focussed on 
the main object of attention, which is usually the lecturer or teacher. 
Listening requires the exercise of three practices: “silence”, an “active 
stance”, and “attention”. Foucault emphasises the awareness that the exercise 
of silence does not only imply remaining silent and attentive while another 
person is speaking. It even implies remaining silent for some time after the 
other person has finished. This is to assure the greatest possible 
internalisation of the newly acquired doctrines. It is obvious that in this 
model, the emphasis is not so much on liberal discussion or some sort of 
teamwork investigation. The idea is quite simply that when the lecturer 
speaks, the students are supposed to listen and to internalise what is being 
presented. 
Concluding these observations on the art of listening, it is interesting to 
see that Foucault sees it as the main pathway to acquiring knowledge. We 
might wonder why reading does not appear in this first stage of “paraskeuê”. 
                                                                                                                                            
transcrivant ses lectures, se les est appropriées et a fait sienne leur vérité: l’écriture transforme 
la chose vue ou entendue ‘en forces et en sang’ (in vires, in sanguinem). Elle se fait dans le 
scripteur lui-même un principe d’action rationnelle.” 
64  Foucault uses Epictetus’ term “lexis” instead of “rhetorics” (or “rhêtorikê tekhnê”). The 
latter seems in contemporary usage to refer to a linguistic structure of discourse. In 
Antiquity, however, it was associated with the effort of talking somebody into 
something, rather than convincing the audience with arguments. 
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The idea underlying this choice is again Foucault’s model of spiritual 
guidance, which rests on the basis of a direct teacher-student-relationship. 
According to this model, we learn through the spoken words of a teacher, not 
by reading books. In fact, Foucault says that throughout the Hellenistic 
period, students were encouraged to “read little”. However, there are 
reported cases of teachers giving written discourses and treatises to their 
students to study, or making recommendations on what to read. We can find 
examples in Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius, which Foucault deals with in the same 
lecture. But we must not forget that in Antiquity, these treatises (such as 
Letters and Consolations) were always directed at an addressee. When Seneca 
writes treatises for Lucilius, for example, because he cannot see him in person, 
he constantly uses the second person address. Thus, even knowledge 
acquisition through reading rests on a personal encounter with one’s teacher, 
albeit a virtual one in this case. 
From my observations on listening, we can infer that in Foucault’s 
model, reading and writing serve a different purpose than what we usually 
suppose them to do. As we have seen, according to this model, one does not 
read in order to learn something new. What was read in the period that 
Foucault analyses? Teachers recommended summaries and florilegia, i.e., 
anthologies of literary extracts.65 Next we have to ask: how were these texts 
produced? This is where reading is linked to writing, for the recommended 
practice was to take notes during reading or immediately after, which in turn 
produced new summaries and florilegia. The ancient term for this type of text 
is “hypomnêmaton”, which alludes to its use as a mnemotechnical support.66 
We have one famous example of a “hypomnêmaton”, which was published 
even though it was never intended to be: the Meditations by Marcus 
Aurelius.67 The unifying principle in these types of texts is not a linguistic or 
logical structure. Instead quotations are drawn from various sources and 
taken out of their original context. The principle which determines choice and 
arrangement of these quotations is rather the demands of the student’s 
process of subjectivation. One chooses doctrines in respect of one’s needs for 
exercise in a certain field or one’s level of progression in philosophy in 
general. This constitutes a circular, or rather a spiral system of reading and 
writing. There is hardly any new data being introduced at any point into the 
system. Most of the time, it revolves around itself and may be described as an 
autopoietic machinery of what is already known. The aim is not to acquire 
                                                 
65  Often, school heads or senior philosophers wrote standard anthologies of the basic 
school doctrines for their disciples. Remember, for instance, the “tetrapharmakos” (the 
“four-fold medicine”) of the Epicureans. 
66  Foucault mentions hypomnêmata in L’herméneutique du sujet, 343. A more detailed 
analysis can be found in: “Ecriture de soi,” DE IV, no. 329: 418-423. 
67  Pierre Hadot puts forward this interpretation of the “Meditations” as an example of a 
“hypomnêmaton” in his study La citadelle intérieure, 64 et seq. 
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knowledge (as is the case when we nowadays read a book or a newspaper), 
but rather to meditate what one knows already in order to internalise it.68 
Why does Foucault focus on this very specific concept of reading and 
writing? I think this emphasis is indeed required in order to conceptually 
grasp reading and writing as tools of meditation rather than tools of 
information exchange. These two activities are part of what Foucault calls the 
“meditation of logoi”. The term is to be understood in one of its classical 
senses as meaning “to practise” or “to exercise oneself” in some activity, 
rather than “to think or to reflect upon”, which has come to eclipse the first 
definition nowadays.69 In this respect, the Latin term “meditare” is a 
translation that combines the aspects of the two Greek terms “meletan” and 
“askein”, from the latter of which the word “ascese” derives. Hence, 
“meditation of logoi” does not mean “reflecting upon elements of doctrine”, 
but rather “practising elements of doctrine”. Along the same lines, meditation 
in Foucault’s terms is a means of self-transformation, an ascetic practice, or as 
he puts it: “un jeu effectué par la pensée sur le sujet”.70 
With the practice of speaking in the educational process, we finally 
find ourselves on the side of the master. Foucault adopts the ancient idea of 
“parrhêsia” to insert a rectifying mechanism into his model of spiritual 
guidance. The term refers to “veridiction”, i.e., truthfulness, sincereness and 
straightforwardness in conversation. It implies the ideal of not trying to 
manipulate one’s interlocutor, but to speak for the sake of argument and the 
content of the discourse. Roman philosophers translated the term “parrhêsia” 
as “libertas”, and Foucault uses either “franchise” or “franc-parler” (the latter 
more frequently) to refer to this idea. The exercise of “parrhêsia” involves 
practising to give well-formed and comprehensible lectures that focus on the 
subject matter and not on rhetorical adornment. Also, the lecturer is to set 
aside any personal intentions of gaining advantage through what he might 
say, but to focus on the needs of his students and to instruct them to their 
advantage. 
The process of education as it is presented in Foucault’s analyses 
essentially involves ascetic exercises and is often described in terms of an 
anticipatory enactment of real-life situations under the vigilant eyes (or the 
                                                 
68  Pierre Hadot, “Réflexions sur la notion de ‘culture de soi’,” Michel Foucault philosophe 
(Paris: Seuil, 1989), 263, criticizes Foucault’s view of writing as a “technology of the 
self”. He claims that according to a philologically faithful interpretation of the ancient 
sources, the exercise of writing was instead meant to approximate the subject to a 
logos of the “kosmos” or of a universal human community. Thus, writing is rather a 
technique of self-dilation than of self-concentration. 
69  Cf. Cicero, De oratore, 1. 61. 260: “Demosthenes perfecit meditando, [my italics, S.H.] ut 
nemo planius esse locutus putaretur.” (Demosthenes achieved through exercise, that 
nobody else could be considered a more even-measured orator.) 
70  L’herméneutique du sujet, 340. 
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imaginary gaze) of a master. The connection to ascetic self-practices, which I 
have presented in the previous section by way of an example, is that during 
his training the student not only acquires and internalises a certain body of 
doctrine (in the above discussed manner), but also performs ascetic exercises, 
sometimes again aimed at internalising certain “logoi”, sometimes intended to 
anticipate and practice possible situations of urgency in everyday life (the loss 
of a beloved person, financial ruin, and other calamities). To put it 
metaphorically, if we can say that disciplinary mechanisms are the “content” 
of ascetic self-practices, then the process of spiritual guidance represents first 
the “mode” of their acquisition, and will later on settle into a stable “attitude” 
of the subject involved in those practices. As I have emphasized in the 
opening lines of this section, spiritual guidance constitutes the primary stage 
of self-constitution, while genuine self-practices (like dietetics) will build on 
the attitude and the way of life that the student has adopted. These two stages 
of ascetic self-practices are interdependent. Remember how Foucault insists 
that “the exercise of discipline requires a device that constrains by the game of 
the gaze”, an important principle that I have discussed in some detail in 
Section II of this paper. According to Foucault, disciplinary practices, 
including ascetic self-practices, involve a characteristic “fold-back” of the 
outside force. Through self-discipline, the subject attains a transcendental 
position to him- or herself, the mode of which is prefigured in the master-
student relationship. Having internalised the master’s gaze, the subject 
involved in self-practices now becomes his or her own supervisor. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have tried to show the terminological and conceptual 
continuity between Foucault’s earlier analytics of power and his later works 
on ethical self-constitution. I have developed a theoretical argument in order 
to show this conceptual continuity. In a next step, I tried to put forward 
evidence to support my thesis. In this respect, I discussed the ways in which 
Foucault analyses the dietetic practices through the mechanism of two types 
of “vigilance”, which decompose the variables of the individual and the 
medium. Hence, they function by the same principle as the “disciplinary 
practices” formerly known from Discipline and Punish. In a further step, I have 
tried to point out how the process of spiritual guidance and the teacher-
student relationship seem to follow a strictly hierarchical model, which 
functions by the principle of “surveillance”. This is yet another avatar from 
Discipline and Punish, reminding us of the “panopticon” and the related 
surveillance techniques. My theoretical argument and both of the model cases 
(i.e., dietetics and spiritual guidance) that I have offered as its benchmark and 
support, were meant to show and clarify the intrinsic relation of “fabrication” 
and “self-constitution” within the process of subjectivation. Each of the two 
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model cases represents one of the two interdependent aspects of “discipline”. 
My discussion of dietetics as an example of an ascetic self-practice was meant 
to show how we find the characteristic mechanisms of disciplinary 
“quadrillage” both here, and in the “dressage” of prisoners and soldiers that 
Foucault had analysed in his earlier works. The process of spiritual guidance, 
discussed in the subsequent section, represents the stage where the subject 
internalises an “attitude” of self-surveillance through constant (real or 
imaginary) supervision by a master. 
The “return of the subject” hypothesis, which I have discussed in 
Section I of this paper, becomes untenable when seen in the light of new 
material such as L’Herméneutique du Sujet. Exponents of this view seem to be 
trying to isolate certain notions and conceptions in Foucault, that in fact form 
part of a larger project, namely a theory (or as Foucault says: “history”) of 
subjectivity in general. Thus, I think that future research in this direction 
should try to interpret the “late” Foucault’s ethics not in opposition to his 
earlier works, but rather as a conceptual complement to them. 
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